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In response to Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United
States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1319 (2009).
Virtually all appellate courts are collegial (i.e., multimember)
courts. Students of judicial behavior (both political scientists and
members of the legal academy), particularly those who view judicial
choice through the lens of strategic behavior, have paid quite a bit of
1
attention to this characteristic of appellate courts, . Of interest recently have been the strategic implications of the panel decisionmak2
ing mechanism relied on by the U.S. courts of appeals. The courts of
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See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10 (1998)
(exploring implications of the fact that “[J]ustices are strategic actors who realize that
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other actors”); FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK,
CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT 28 (2000) (“[W]e hope to show that . . . our
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See, e.g., VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK,
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 73-88 (2006) (analyzing strategic behavior in circuit
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appeals decide most cases with the use of rotating, three-judge pa3
nels, but the decision of a panel is subject to two kinds of review: review by the circuit en banc and review by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Presumably, a strategic member of a panel could attempt to signal to
the circuit en banc or to the Supreme Court when, contrary to her
preferences, the panel decision is at odds with circuit law or Supreme
Court precedent. The key, then, from a strategic perspective, is to
understand how the ideological composition of a panel (relative to
the circuit or relative to the Supreme Court) can induce strategic behavior on the part of an individual judge.
This is precisely the task to which Professor Kim sets herself in Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical
4
Exploration of Panel Effects. To do so, she uses the votes cast in Title VII
sex discrimination cases decided with published opinions in the courts
5
of appeals. Specifically, Professor Kim focuses on counter-ideological
6
voting. The measurement strategy she takes is elegant; she defines
counter-ideological voting as an instance in which a judge votes liberally when she is expected, based on her ideological preferences, to
7
vote conservatively, or vice versa. The use of this dependent variable
is advantageous in that strategic accounts of judicial vote choice are
explicitly about whether a judge modifies her behavior systematically
in response to the anticipated actions of other relevant actors (e.g.,
8
the Supreme Court). This dependent variable is explicitly about
change in anticipated behavior. Moreover, Professor Kim’s empirical
analyses are constructed to determine whether the likelihood of counter-ideological voting varies according to the alignment of a judge’s

tegic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123,
125 (2004) (discussing the “(non)use of dissents to induce (or prevent) en banc review
by the circuit”); Steven R. Van Winkle, Dissent as a Signal: Evidence from the U.S.
Courts of Appeals 6-16 (Aug. 29, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(proposing a model of strategic behavior based on imperfect commitment, information asymmetry, and costly enforcement on the U.S. courts of appeals).
3
See JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS 70-84 (2002) (describing the internal procedural rules governing appellate court review).
4
Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An
Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319 (2009).
5
Id. at 1327.
6
Id. at 1328.
7
Id.
8
Cf. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 1, at 12 (“To say that a [J]ustice acts strategically is to say that she realizes that her success or failure depends on the preferences of
other actors and the actions she expects them to take, not just on her own preferences
and actions.”).
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preferences with those of her panel mates and, ultimately, either
9
those of the circuit en banc or the Supreme Court. She concludes
that judges do not anticipate the likely reactions of the Supreme
10
Court but do bear in mind the likely reactions of the circuit en banc.
The evidence Professor Kim brings to bear is a welcome addition
to the extant literature; however, what ultimately emerges from her
analyses is a bit different than what she initially articulates as her
avowed purpose. Early in her article, Professor Kim asserts that her
intention is to offer “an empirical test of two competing types of ex11
planations: deliberative and strategic.” She describes deliberative
explanations as “those theories that emphasize the internal exchanges
that occur among panel members and the potential for these ex12
changes to influence a judge’s vote.” However, the subsequent tests,
although empirically crisp and clear, are really tests of two competing
strategic explanations for panel effects (i.e., strategy vis-à-vis the Supreme Court and strategy vis-à-vis the courts of appeals en banc) rather than a test of a strategic versus a deliberative theory of panel effects.
While it is certainly fair to say that the empirical patterns Professor
Kim finds are consistent with one strategic account of panel effects,
they are also consonant with at least some versions of a deliberative
account. Professor Kim asserts that “if purely deliberative explanations are true, the preferences of the Supreme Court or the circuit as
a whole should have no systematic impact on whether or when panel
13
effects are observed.” But a deliberative model where panel members engage in an exchange of ideas and arguments can also lead to
an observed pattern in which the preferences of the circuit en banc
and the alignment of those preferences with the judges on a panel
have an effect. As Professor Kim observes,
The individual appellate judge interacts with other judges on the same
circuit on a regular basis—on other panel sittings, in the context of administrative functions, and even casually in the halls of the courthouse. . . . Because of the routine, ongoing interactions among judges
within a circuit, the views of their immediate colleagues will be far more
salient for panel members when they deliberate than the preferences of
14
the Supreme Court.

9

Kim, supra note 4, at 1328.
Id.
11
Id. at 1324.
12
Id. at 1325.
13
Id. at 1327.
14
Id. at 1369 (footnote omitted).
10
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Although Professor Kim points to this interaction among court of
appeals judges as a possible explanation for why they are attentive to
their circuit colleagues but not their Supreme Court superiors, this
same interaction is at the root of the behavioral equivalence that undermines the definitive interpretation of her empirical evidence as
supporting a strategic account of panel effects. A judge who is in the
minority on a panel but in the majority on the circuit certainly may
raise arguments in the panel deliberations that are intended to highlight the threat of the panel decision being overturned by the circuit
en banc. But such a judge may also present arguments about circuit
preferences (as embedded in circuit precedent) because they are the
kind of arguments that will persuade her fellow panelists to see her
position as the legally correct one.
Professor Kim herself is careful to acknowledge that her results
“do not conclusively establish that strategic behavior explains panel ef15
fects.” She readily acknowledges that judges on a panel may be influenced by nonstrategic, psychological aspects of their interactions
that result in changes in the “judges’ perceptions and sincere views of
16
a case.” But she cautions that “[t]hese psychological theories are difficult to verify empirically because they emphasize processes that are
17
internal to individual judges and cannot be observed directly.” In
making this observation, however, Professor Kim falls prey to a proclivity shared by most strategic theorists. Specifically, Professor Kim
appears to resolve the issue of behavioral equivalence in favor of a
strategic account of panel effects, even though that account is no less
difficult to verify empirically than a deliberative account that focuses
on nonstrategic, shared cogitation among panel members aimed at
coming to the most legally sound outcome.
Two caveats are in order. First, it is important to emphasize that
Professor Kim is by no means rigid in her interpretation of the empirical evidence that she provides to support an account of panel effects
as the product of strategy vis-à-vis the circuit en banc. She carefully
explores potential alternative explanations, including the deliberative
18
dynamics that may drive panel decisionmaking. But, in the end, she
is inclined toward finding the strategic account to be the best fit for
the evidence.
15

Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1371.
17
Id.
18
See id. at 1371-74 (discussing conformity effects, group polarization, and other
psychological theories as possible explanations for panel effects in circuit courts).
16
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Second, we are not asserting that the evidence presented is a better fit for a nonstrategic, deliberative account of panel effects. Rather,
the point we wish to make is that the evidence presented is equally
consistent with both a strategic and a deliberative account of panel effects. Further, the deliberative account is no more or less complicated
than the strategic account. Stated differently, the strategic account is
no more parsimonious or elegant than a deliberative account. Accordingly, there is no basis for favoring a strategic theory over a delibera19
tive theory of panel effects.
If we set aside the issue of behavioral equivalence for the moment
and take the evidence that Professor Kim offers as support for a strategic account of panel effects, there are two additional points worth
noting. The first highlights the limitations of the inferences that can
be drawn from a study such as Professor Kim’s, which focuses exclusively on Title VII sex discrimination cases. These cases constitute an
entirely reasonable and appropriate set of decisions for examining strategic accounts of judicial behavior, because of their ideological con20
tent. Simply put, such cases are likely to bring ideological considerations to the fore, and strategic accounts are, first and foremost, about
the conditional expression of ideological preferences. A focus on any
one substantive type of case, however, means that the generalizability
of any inferences is circumscribed. Accordingly, any claims about strategic accounts of panel effects writ large, based on the analysis of this or any
other substantive set of cases, should be tempered by this recognition.
Second, Professor Kim’s finding regarding the Supreme Court’s
lack of influence over circuit judges’ voting behavior is readily anticipated in the existing literature. Professor Kim concludes that “the
increased possibility of review [by the Supreme Court] in the presence
of a potential dissenter does not appear to influence the panel voting
21
behavior of court of appeals judges.” She speculates that dissents are
impotent as threats to trigger Supreme Court review because circuit
22
judges do not fear reversal in any meaningful sense. In 2003, David
Klein and Robert Hume published what we think may be the most
thorough analysis of circuit judges’ fear of reversal existing in the lite19

We recognize that parsimony as a benchmark for evaluating a scientific theory is
not universally agreed upon, but it is a benchmark often invoked by strategic theorists
and, moreover, is consistent with our own epistemological predispositions. For a useful discussion of parsimony, see, for example, Paul K. MacDonald, Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory, 97 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 551, 556-57 (2003).
20
Kim, supra note 4, at 1327 & n.29.
21
Id. at 1368.
22
Id. at 1367-68.
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23

rature. Using a well-mined data source on search and seizure decisions compiled by Jeffrey Segal, Klein and Hume sought to measure
how well the “fear of reversal” explains circuit-court compliance with
24
Supreme Court policy pronouncements. To do so, they first identified cases that were the most “cert-worthy” in order to evaluate whether circuit judges were more likely to defer to Supreme Court prefe25
rences in cases that the Court was likely to review. As the authors
described their approach, “[I]f the desire to avoid [reversal] were a
major force behind compliance, then deference to a higher court
would vary with the threat of reversal: other things remaining equal,
compliance would be more likely where the probability that a non26
compliant decision would be reversed was higher.” Yet the authors
found no evidence of differential voting behavior between cert-worthy
27
and more ordinary cases. Although Klein and Hume acknowledged
that they were also working with a data set in a limited issue area, they
speculated that the reason that compliance is observed even without
fear of reversal is related to judges’ efforts to “reach legally sound de28
cisions.” Thus, given Klein and Hume’s earlier analysis, we should
perhaps not be surprised that circuit court judges neither dissent stra29
tegically in order to prompt Supreme Court review nor vote counterideologically to avoid it.
In conclusion, we do not quarrel with the possibility that strategic
behavior may take place on some circuit courts, in some cases, under
some conditions. But our earlier work finding no such effects suggests that the strongest influences on federal appellate courts come
from the collegial environment in which judges seek consensus to
promote the efficient administration of justice and to minimize er30
ror. Deliberation within the panel over the proper interpretation of
circuit precedent, as well as compliance with Supreme Court policy,

23

David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court
Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579 (2003).
24
Id. at 580-81, 586.
25
Id. at 588-94.
26
Id. at 600.
27
See id. at 594 (finding that cert-worthy cases were actually slightly less likely to be
decided consistently with Supreme Court preferences).
28
Id. at 602.
29
HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 2, at 86 (finding “no evidence of strategic [dissenting] behavior in cases across the board”).
30
See id. at 120 (“[A]ppellate judges share the common objective of maximizing
the number of ‘correct’ decisions with the primary goal of error minimization through
appellate review.”).
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furthers these ends. Thus, although strategic explanations may provide some measure of insight into circuit judge behavior, the bulk of
the evidence across multiple issue areas is probably more consistent
with a form of consensual “team theory” than with rational-choice
theory. Having made these observations, we want to reiterate that,
while the larger literature devoted to strategic decisionmaking takes
the collegial nature of appellate courts seriously, it does so only very
narrowly by conceptualizing the multimember court solely as a space
for strategic calculations by judges. Professor Kim, in contrast, wishes
to take seriously the possibility of nonstrategic explanations for panel
effects. We think she is right to do so.
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